



End to End Data Protection with Encryption

David Kwak; dkwak@marvell.com

Ali Khwaja; akhwaja@marvell.com


Craig W. Carlson; cwcarlson@marvell.com

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Goal

- Provide uninterrupted end-to-end data protection
 - Never allow a window where undetected corruption can take place
 - Focus of this presentation is the encryption/decryption phase for FC-SP-2 based encryption
- Encryption protection
 - Window of risk during encryption/decryption process
 - An error in the crypto engine can result in undetected corrupted data
 - This error could be the result of a memory error or other source

FC ESP Encryption Process




- During Encryption process, FC Frame CRC recomputed on encrypted data
 - This leaves a window of vulnerability during which errors could be introduced
 - An error during the encryption process could introduce undetected data corruption
 - This violates the premise of end-to-end data protection
 - (NOTE: The same type of vulnerability also exists during decryption)
- NOTE: ICV (Integrity Check Value) in the ESP_Trailer does not cover this
 - Computed AFTER payload is encrypted

Why does T10 DIF or NVMe Protection information not cover this?

- T10 DIF and NVMe Protection Information are an FC-4 feature
 - Not under control of the Fibre Channel transport
 - May or may not be implemented or enabled by the devices
- The goal is to have **Transport** level end-to-end protection

FC ESP Double Encryption Process




- One solution
 - Encrypt the data twice and compare the results
 - If CRCe1 and CRCe2 are equal then data integrity has been maintained and encrypted frame can be transmitted
 - This would also be done on the receiver side as a double decryption
- Downside to this approach
 - Added complexity and possible extra latency to encryption/decryption process
 - To do efficiently, may require dual encryption/decryption engines
- Pro
 - This approach does not require any change to the Standard

Proposed Solution


- Propose adding an optional 16-bit CRC field to the ESP Padding
 - CRC would be computed before encryption takes place on the transmitter and checked after decryption on the receiver
 - Allows for overlapping data protection with FC Frame CRC (or other data checking as done by implementation)
 - Proposing basing CRC on T10 DIF CRC
- Pros
 - Does not require double encryption/decryption
 - Instead simple fast CRC calculation
- Cons
 - Requires Standard change
 - But, if we make it optional/negotiable allows for older implementations

FC ESP Encryption/Decryption Process Proposal



- Overlapping protection
 - On Transmit
 - T10 CRC computed
 - Data encrypted
 - FC CRC recomputed as FC CRCe
 - On Receive
 - FC CRCe checked
 - Data decrypted
 - Decrypted data checked against T10 CRC
- Note: Implementations may not present full FC Frames from/to the encryption engine, but this mechanism works even if there is simply a check on the data going into/out of the encryption engine
 - What matters is that T10 CRC checks that data was not corrupted during encryption/decryption

Frame Format Proposal



- Add 16 bit T10 DIF CRC to beginning of ESP_Trailer padding
 - 16 bits is the minimum pad length

- T10 DIF CRC is calculated across
 - Unencrypted payload
 - FC Frame header with D_ID, S_ID, and CS_CTL set to zero
 - This is the same as done for the Integrity Check Value in the ESP_Trailer

Other Details

- Other details to be determined
 - Negotiation on support of use of T10 DIF CRC in ESP_Trailer padding
 - Potentially allow CRC negotiation to support newer 32 bit and 64 bit DIF defined in T10

Summary

- End-to-end data protection is important for enterprise customers
- Proposal is to allow for a standardized, optional, backward compatible data check field on the encrypted data
 - By adding CRC field to ESP_Trailer padding
- Thoughts?



Thank You



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